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Abstract 
 This paper builds on a theoretical framework developed by Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013) 
to advance research on workforce participation in the social economy.  We extend their framework, 
then test its efficacy through a discussion of governance at the Mondragon Co-operative 
Corporation (MCC) and John Lewis Partnership (JLP). Our thinking is influenced by Arnstein 
(1969), Pateman (1970), Hyman and Mason (1995), Harley, Hyman and Thompson (2005) and 
Gaventa (2006). Using Gaventa’s work on ‘spaces’, we offer a new composite framework to 
generate insights into the social practices at MCC (in Spain) and JLP (in the UK).  We conclude by 
theorising that the ‘visible’ power of an enabling constitution combined with the ‘invisible’ power 
of social economy’s normative values and principles can reshape managerial identities. It does this 
by reinforcing the rights of worker-members to continually (re)claim the spaces in which workplace 
democracy occurs, and to use it to reverse the hiring relationship between capital and labour. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, we consider staff participation in decision-making by asking the question “what can 
be learnt about workforce participation through a comparison of the governance systems of the 
Mondragon coops and John Lewis Partnership?” As authors, we have professional and academic 
interests in the role of discursive democracy in the development of inclusive governance systems. 
Moreover, there has been particular interest by the UK Government in “mutual” organisations to 
deliver services traditionally under the purview of public sector bodies (The Cabinet Office, 2014).  
It is, therefore, timely to review the way contributions to the field of co-operative studies can inform 
efforts to democratise organisations and practice inclusive governance across an expanding social 
economy. 
To facilitate this review, we outline the literature on the governance of the Mondragon Co-
operative Corporation and John Lewis Partnership (hereafter referred to as MCC and JLP 
respectively) to gain a theoretical understanding of key issues. MCC is constituted under Spanish 
Co-operative Law (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).  JLP - while not satisfying UK legal definitions for a 
bone fide co-operative – is widely recognised as one (Cathcart, 2009).  It is second in the list of the 
UK’s 100 largest co-operatives (Co-operatives UK, 2013), and 34th in the International Cooperative 
Alliance’s list of the largest 300 cooperatives in the world1.  Both organisations make corporate 
commitments to education as a means of sharing power and facilitating cooperative cultures (Lewis, 
1954; Cheney, 2002; JLP, 2013; Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014). There are a sufficient number of 
studies of them both to test a theory of workforce participation that we build in this paper.  
The paper is divided into four sections.  In the first section, we navigate the debate about the 
impact of governance structures, processes and relationships on the distributions of power.  We 
problematize assumptions about the link between participation, decision-making and democracy on 
the basis that it matters which interest group creates, controls and manages the spaces in which 
participation takes place.  In the second section, we set out the context for governance at MCC and 
JLP, then apply our framework to develop insights into their governance systems. In the third 
section, we turn our attention to the way that the framework and reported practices at MCC and JLP 
can inform the field of governance in the wider social economy. In the final section, we summarise 
the paper and consider how an enabling constitution combined with normative values and principles 
can act to reshape managerial identities and bring about changes in the relationships between 
managers, capital and labour. 
                                                 
1
  As reported on 4
th
 February 2014 by Co-operative News -  
http://www.thenews.coop/49090/news/general/view-top-300-co-operatives-around-world/  
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Governance Structures, Power and Participation  
Kim (2008) defines governance as: 
“...a process of strategic institutional-decision-making, and the authority to 
determine whom they involve and how and to whom they render account.” 
(Kim, 2008, p. 33 emphasis added) 
 Thus governance structures determine the sources of power (‘authority’) to participate 
(‘whom they involve and how’) in determining systems of management. Lukes (2005) advances a 
theory in which there are three domains of power. The first is represented through observable 
expressions of power: the institutions and arrangements through which debate takes place in which 
parties are formally admitted and able to participate. This, however, ignores a hidden manifestation 
of power that looks beyond the assumptions of behaviourist theory. The second level of power is 
rooted in the agenda setting powers that each party in an institution can bring to bear. Lukes argues 
that the party identified as responsible for management can exert greater power over agendas and 
use this power to shape the topics that get discussed. Thirdly, Lukes argues that this capacity to 
manipulate agendas can be extended to communication systems and media. Active management of 
communication systems and media outlets enables a controlling elite to silence opposition to its 
ideas, and secure hegemonic control by ‘manufacturing consent’ (Gramsci, 1971; Chomsky & 
Herman, 1988).   
Through these techniques, a population can be socialised into accepting the political agendas 
of those who have acquired management control, and can lose opportunities to engage in critical 
debate regarding their basis. Lukes theorises this as invisible power on the basis that affected parties 
may be oblivious to the process by which they came to accept the discourse of ‘others’. Where there 
is management control over channels of communication, and this is used to prevent access to 
alternative bodies of knowledge, members of a workforce become unaware that their subjectivity is 
being manipulated (Townley, 1994).  
Lukes’ dimensions have been adapted by VeneKlasen and Miller as:  
 Visible Power: the power to influence / participate in decision-making  Hidden Power: the power to set (political) agendas   Invisible Power: the power to shape meaning and what is acceptable 
(VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002; Gaventa, 2006, p. 29) 
These dimensions are used as part of Gaventa’s (2006) Power Cube (see Figure 1).  We believe that 
place and space are useful framing concepts for a discussion of participation. Cornwall (2004) 
contends that a spatial framework recognises the situated and bounded quality of participation, and 
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that participatory practices can change across an organisation depending on who has power over a 
given space.  
Figure 1: The Power Cube (Gaventa, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The depth of participation in a given space is dependent on the way power is exercised by 
those who have created them. Gaventa (2006) identified 3 types of space, namely ‘closed’, ‘invited’ 
and ‘claimed’. Closed spaces are where discussion and decision making is limited to an ‘elite’, and 
participation by the wider workforce does not happen, nor is it felt necessary. Power (visible, 
hidden and invisible) can all be exercised in each space. This is also the case with invited spaces 
where the capacity to participate is conditional on the power needs of an ‘elite’. As 
Marchington (2005) argues, many ‘participation schemes’ are initiated and sponsored by managers 
to limit the likelihood that a similar space will be claimed and created by the workforce. This 
sponsorship (and political support) lasts only as long as it serves management needs and is 
frequently withdrawn when business conditions change. Claimed spaces are created by the 
workforce either independently or in collaboration with identified holders of power. Cornwall 
(2004) contends that power in these spaces is contested.   
There has been previous research into the nature of deepening participation. In the sphere of 
civilian politics, Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation has become a popular framework. It 
describes eight scales of ‘participation’ from manipulation of a population through to citizen 
control. The eight steps of the ladder are grouped into ‘non-participation’, ‘degrees of tokenism’ 
and ‘degrees of citizen power’. The theory is useful for recognising that participation schemes can 
be designed and delivered in ways that prevent meaningful participation.  
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In the field of workplace democracy, however, it is Pateman’s (1970) work that is more 
widely cited. We choose this as our starting point for developing a new theory. She identified three 
levels of participation: ‘Pseudo’ where participation is effectively limited to endorsement of 
management ideas and plans; ‘Partial’ where the workforce can influence decisions but have no 
power to negotiate outcomes; and ‘Full’ where workers collectively have power to both influence 
and bargain about policy goals and outcomes (Pateman, 1970). Knudsen, Busck and Lind (2011) 
contend though that pseudo participation is difficult to identify in practice as the initiation of 
consultation by a management group seeking endorsement of its ideas for can have the side effect of 
empowering workers to secure participation that goes beyond the original intentions of managers.  
Hyman & Mason (1995) offer an alternate trio that is well aligned with Pateman’s 
conceptualisation.  Employee Involvement (EI) takes place when employee participation is 
managerially controlled and task based. It is viewed as an integrative unitary approach where both 
workers and managers share a common core purpose for the business. It is now commonly 
associated with managerial rhetoric on performance management (Willmott, 1993; Grey, 1995; 
Johnson, 2006) and has matured into the field of employee engagement in management texts and 
government agendas (MacLeod & Clarke, 2009).  Employee Participation (EP) is defined by 
Hyman & Mason (1995) as collective representation either through state sponsored interventions or 
the result of workers’ own initiatives. In this case, the integrity of management hierarchies is 
partially broken, but the workforce cannot collectively overrule management proposals (only 
negotiate their content). Industrial Democracy (ID) includes cooperatives and organisations with 
democratic and participative structures. In this case, decision making at different levels of the 
organisation is undertaken by (and/or is accountable to) members-owners (Cornforth, et al., 1988; 
Ellerman, 1990; Turnbull, 2001; 2002). In an industrial democracy, managers are framed as 
subservient to the workforce (the owners), and constitutional arrangements ensure that the 
workforce can collectively exercise their power to remove managers who do not act in their 
interests (JLP, 2015).  The choice of ‘democracy’ as opposed to ‘participation’ at this level reflects 
Robbins (1972) contention that there is a need to recognise the conceptual difference between 
participation initiated from the top by management, and bottom up initiatives by the workforce 
(Ellerman, 1990; Birchall, 2012; Ridley-Duff, 2012). 
 Ridley-Duff and Ponton, (2013) offer a more nuanced typology that builds on Hyman and 
Mason (1995) and Hollingshead, Nicholls and Tailby (2003), and reintroduces the realm of ‘non-
participation’ (no involvement) identified by Arnstein (1969). The typology describes management 
styles associated with different ‘depths’ of participation.  In Table 1, we offer a composite 
framework in which ‘lower’ levels of participation might also constitute part of an industrial 
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democracy (on the basis that these have been ‘claimed’ by workforce members and can be modified 
at their behest).  Ridley-Duff and Ponton's typology differs from preceding typologies in two other 
ways. Firstly, it identifies a category of No Involvement by recognising that in some workplaces 
new recruits have to ‘muddle through’ by asking colleagues how things are done. In this culture, 
there is minimal or no instruction by a management group. Secondly, they offer a more cautious 
view on the links between participation and democracy by commenting that:  
"…the relationship between ‘democracy’ and ‘participation’ is a complex one, and it is not 
automatically the case that increases in the scope, depth, level and forms of participation 
lead to industrial democracy (Harley et al., 2005)" 
 
Table 1: Mapping of Typologies and Spaces against the ‘depths’ proposed by Ridley-Duff and 
Ponton (2013). 
 Spaces 
Arnstein (1969), 
Pateman (1970,  
Hyman & Mason 
(1995) 
Ridley-Duff & Ponton (2013, p.13 and 24) 
Gaventa 
(2006) 
Non-Participation 
No Involvement: a management style where members/employees are not invited to 
meetings or elected to management bodies to contribute to operational or strategic 
decision-making.  Typically, staff are not provided with any verbal or written guidance by 
managers and/or governors before decisions are made. 
Closed 
Pseudo / Employee 
Involvement (EI) 
 
Passive involvement: a management style where members/employees are provided with 
both written and verbal guidance by managers and/or governors, but are not invited or 
elected (individually or in groups) to contribute to operational or strategic decision-
making. 
Invited 
Active Involvement: a management style where members/employees (individually or in 
groups) have discussions about (pre-formed) management proposals, but are not invited 
or elected to participate in the formation of these proposals, or final decisions about their 
implementation. 
Partial / Employee 
Participation (EP) 
Managed Participation: a management style where members/employees (individually or 
in groups) can participate in the development of ideas, and where managers focus on 
coaching members/employees to develop their ideas into proposals, and support them 
during implementation.  Managers retain some powers to screen-out weak proposals. 
Full Participation / 
Industrial Democracy 
(ID) 
Member-Driven Participation: a management style where any member/employee 
(individually or in groups) can initiate discussions on operational or strategic issues, 
arrange and participate in meetings to develop proposals, and exercise both voice and 
voting power when decisions are made about implementation. 
Claimed 
 It matters who creates and claims the spaces, and who sets the terms for participation in a 
given space. For Ridley-Duff and Ponton, there is a further aspect of participation that is rarely 
acknowledged and discussed.  In a cooperative, a closed or invited space might itself be a response 
to a decision taken by members: it can be a management space created as a by-product of 
participatory democracy. In this case, the workforce can collectively agree to create spaces into 
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which it invites management. The power to create and invite ‘others’ into a space can be defined in 
a constitution (or Articles of Association) which is itself subject to change only under conditions of 
participatory democracy. Interestingly, Ridley-Duff and Ponton view the right of the governed to 
exclude themselves from decision-making spaces of their choosing (and their capacity to delegate 
responsibility to a person or body that remains under their control) as a more sophisticated approach 
to workplace democracy that is compatible with a desire for operational efficiency and 
effectiveness: 
 "The label ‘democratic participation’ to describe depth 5 is not defensible.  A more fitting 
label is ‘member-driven participation’ in that the power to participate belongs to the 
member and is not ‘managed’ by others…democratic management is understood as the 
propensity and capacity of management systems to respond to workforce members’ desires 
regarding the scope, depth, level and quality of their participation in management." 
(Ridley-Duff & Ponton, 2013, pp. 23, emphasis in the original) 
To summarise, we have set out a framework (Table 1) that will guide our exploration of the 
complexities of workforce participation in our two case studies. We have focussed our attention on 
different theorisations of the ‘levels’ and ‘depths’ of participation to argue that the relationship 
between managers and managed can be subject to a constitution that defines the powers of a 
management group and wider workforce to create spaces into which they invite each other for 
various management discussions and decision-making processes. Wherever this power is available 
to multiple interest groups, ‘management’ is just one of several groups capable of exercising 
management control. It is no longer the preserve of self-appointed elites and it potentially 
transforms the enterprise governance system from one that protects the narrow interests of finance 
capital to one that protects the wider interests of member-owners (Birchall, 2012). 
A Note on Methodology  
Whilst this paper is concerned with advancing and testing a theoretical framework, it takes evidence 
from secondary sources (both historical and recent) and company documentation published by 
MCC and JLP. Normally, this would leave the authors vulnerable to a claim that the data set is 
unreliable due to the ‘filtering’ of the accounts of the cases study organisations. Fortunately, two of 
the authors have previously undertaken fieldwork in them. The second author studied JLP closely 
for a PhD study in 2014. This involved non-participant observation at JLP from the 4
th
 – 28th June 
2014. He spent 68 hours onsite, had 62 contacts with over 50 different people who engaged in 33 
hours of conversation (6.5 hrs of which were recorded and transcribed). Meetings also took place 
with two groups of managers and members of the Partner Voice committee. The third named author 
undertook field work at Mondragon during a PhD study in 2003 and has since maintained contact 
with staff and researchers at Mondragon for over a decade. Fieldwork included 16 hours of contact 
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time over 2.5 days (4
th
 – 6th March 2003), provided opportunities to discuss four cooperatives with 
nine different people. In the evenings he recorded more than 2 hours of audio diary commentary, 
transcribed a further 2.5 hrs of recordings from meetings and made 28 pages of notes and 
reflections on meetings with three other people on the same field trip. While this paper does not 
depend on (and is not derived from an analysis of) these author’s field work experiences, it puts the 
research team as a whole in a much stronger position to interpret claims in academic studies, 
company documents and third-party accounts of life inside the case study organisations. 
The Contexts for Governance at MCC and JLP 
The corporate structures of MCC (see Figure 2) and JLP (see Figure 3) share similarities in that 
they are both independent, self-governing organisations that represent federations of interests 
(Forcadell, 2005; Cathcart, 2013). The governing bodies at the apex of both institutions are tripartite 
structures protected by constitutions that set out power sharing arrangements and commitments to 
social, economic and environmental goals.   
The institutions that underpin governance in the MCC started in 1941 with the formation of 
a technical school in the Basque region of Spain (Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2015). In the late 1950s, 
graduates of the school started an industrial enterprise that led to the formation of a community 
bank (Caja Laborale), research and development body (Ikerlan), social insurance scheme (Lagun-
Aro). By 1980, over 80 cooperative enterprises had been supported by over 300,000 people through 
the community bank (The Mondragon Experiment, 1980). By the year 2000, 85 per cent of citizens 
in the town of Mondragon had a direct or indirect interest in one or more cooperatives (Long Island 
University, 2000).    
The MCC is a secondary cooperative comprised of primary cooperatives (mostly industrial 
producer cooperatives). Under its constitution (and Spanish Co-operative Law) both secondary and 
primary cooperatives make contributions to social and educational projects in the community in 
addition to servicing the needs of their members. The Congress has sovereign power over decisions 
made by the Standing Committee and General Council of the Corporation and votes according to 
the wishes of the individual cooperatives. Member co-operatives also have a tripartite governance 
structure organised around three bodies: a Governing Council; a Social Council and; a Management 
Council (Turnbull, 2002; Ridley-Duff, 2010). 
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Figure 2: MCC Corporate Governance Structure (Freundlich, et al., 2009) 
 
 
 There is a similar tripartite structure at JLP, but this time centred on the powers of the 
Chairman (sic), a Partnership Council and Partnership Board. This structure was devised by John 
Spedan Lewis who inherited his father’s private firm (established 1864) in 1928. From 1914 he had 
been using a single branch to try out his “experiment in industrial democracy”. He transformed it 
from loss making to profitable, improved working conditions, initiated profit sharing (“the 
partnership benefit”), then introduced communication between the rank and file and management 
via “committees for communication” and weekly newsletters. Partly in response to his unease at 
receiving a third share in £26000 whilst the 300 employees received £16000 between them (worth 
£2m and £1.2m when adjusted for inflation (Erdal, 2011)), he created two irrevocable settlements in 
1929 and 1950 through which he handed ownership in its entirety to a body that manages it for the 
benefit of all ‘partners’ (i.e. the workforce). Protected by statutory law, this can never be sold off 
(Lewis, 1948; 1954). JLP now employs over 90,000 partners with a turnover in excess of £10bn. In 
2014 every partner received 15% of their salary as the partnership benefit (JLP, 2014).  
There is now a ‘trust company’ (John Lewis Partnership Trust Ltd) that holds shares in a 
public limited company (plc). A number of further trusts and foundations have been created to 
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advance social goals (Erdal, 2011; JLP, 2013; Cathcart, 2009; 2013). The plc is structured to control 
two retail chains (John Lewis Stores and Waitrose) whereas the trust company maintains the 
shareholding that benefits partners. 
Figure 3 – John Lewis Partnership Corporate Structure   
 
Interpretation of Cathcart (2009; 2013) and JLP (2013; 2014)  
On paper, both MCC’s and JLP’s governing arrangements place (elected) leaders in a 
servant role, channelling their efforts to the benefit of members’ individual and collective needs. In 
2003, MCC formalised a management model based on "the individual and their satisfaction, with 
the aim of achieving total quality" (Ridley-Duff, 2010, p. 130).  This echoes Principle 1 in the 
constitution of JLP which states that its "ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, 
through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful business" (JLP, 2013, p. 7).  
By writing such principles into the constitutions of both organisations, it commits those in 
the governing bodies to operate for wider stakeholder benefit (including the community). By 
constituting under Co-operative Law, MCC must invest 10% of surplus in education and social 
projects. JLP is not under a statutory duty, but includes commitments to customers and the 
community (Part 2, Principles 5, 6 and 7), and supports this by constituting ‘sustainability teams’ in 
its operating divisions (see Figure 3) and makes donations. For example, in 2015, it donated 3.5% 
of pre-tax profits for use in the community, 3.5 times more than the corporate average (JLP, 2015).  
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Both JLPs principles and the Corporate Model at MCC represent a substantial departure 
from private sector norms in which senior managers are the agents of external investors and use 
control rights linked to shareholders’ capital investments to institute management practices that 
increase the value of shareholders’ capital (Erdal, 2011).  The commitment to workplace democracy 
is expressed in MCC’s second principle which makes admission conditional on accepting "the basic 
equality of worker-members in terms of their rights to be, possess and know, which implies 
acceptance of a democratically organised company" (MCC, 2014).  This is similar to JLPs 
constitutional commitment based on John Spedan Lewis's commitment to an "industrial democracy 
where employees share knowledge, power and profit" and to create a culture in which there is "as 
much equality…as differences of responsibility permit" (JLP, 2013, pp. 3, 7). 
Developing Insights into MCC’s and JLP’s Governance Systems 
At start-up, all the spaces for participation at MCC were 'claimed' as it operated without an explicit 
structure for its first 3 years (Whyte & Whyte, 1991; Molina, 2013). In 1959, the constitution was 
developed by Ulgor’s founders in discussion with Father José Maria Arizmendiarrieta 
(‘Arizmendi’) (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).  Whether this amounted to a closed space where visible 
power was being exercised is debatable: the constitution as it evolved was discussed and shaped 
with the associates who worked on an informal cooperative basis. It is worth noting, however, that 
invisible power was being exercised, particularly by Arizmendi, based on his studies of Catholic 
Social Doctrine and Co-operative Principles (Herrera, 2003; Ridley-Duff, 2010). His application of 
doctrine to the concepts and ideas of other social reformers, most notably Robert Owen and the 
Rochdale Pioneers (Whyte & Whyte, 1991) resulted in 10 cooperative principles that act as a 
benign invisible power. Documentary evidence continues to surface that attests to the enduring 
relevance of these underlying principles (Shift Change, 2013). 
Cheney (2002), however, argued that the popularity of managerialist frameworks and 
market pressures can compromise the integrity of spaces that were originally ‘claimed’ by changing 
them into spaces where member-owners are ‘invited’. These may have more in common with 
employee participation schemes than industrial democracies, in which workers feel obligated to 
agree with managers rather than exercise autonomous power (Kasmir, 1996). Nevertheless, all 
cooperatives within MCC have a General Assembly comprising the whole workforce which can 
vote on issues, and in those spaces there is a one-member, one-vote principle (see Figure 4). As 
Whyte and Whyte’s (1991) study shows, this power enables the workforce to reclaim spaces 
colonised by managers, and maintain the General Assembly’s ultimate sovereignty over all 
decisions. Moreover, the members of each business unit can vote to leave the MCC to operate 
independently (Ridley-Duff, 2005; Mccrea, 2012). The power to ‘exit’ is a characteristic of the 
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associative democracy discussed by Smith and Teasdale (2012) which provides further checks on 
managerialist tendencies. Lastly, the Social Council exists to represent worker interests: its 
members are elected from departments by members of the General Assembly, and are not appointed 
by managers (see Figure 4). 
The governance of individual cooperatives essentially replicates the structure of the 
congress (and vice versa). While primary cooperatives have individual members, the MCC 
Congress has organisational members with voting power proportional to the headcount in individual 
cooperatives. This prevents any one organisation having undue influence (Freundlich, et al., 2009). 
Figure 4 - Governance in Individual 
MCC Co-operatives 
The MCC cooperatives operationalise the 
delegation of powers to people within these 
invited spaces (Forcadell, 2005). Power is 
made visible in that there is transparency in the 
decisions and political agendas pursued by their 
members, and they are continually shaped by 
the overarching cooperative principles. These 
governance structures therefore would appear 
to represent the highest level of democratic 
participation in all three typologies. 
Cooperative members are invited into spaces 
that were claimed by founding members, where 
power is made visible and vested in the 
workforce. 
Hyman and Mason (1995), however, contend that MCC is often run on ‘hierarchical lines’ 
and despite the overall control mechanisms available to the workforce, management is essentially in 
control. This claim, however, is full of paradoxes, as shown by the reactions to a 1974 strike by 
workers. In the following decade, the General Assembly eventually accepted the overturning of 
management control over the closed spaces it had created, and returned them to member-control.  
The dispute stemmed from the workforce’s feeling that visible power from management was being 
imposed and that despite discussions on changes to working practices in invited spaces, concerns 
about the implementation process had not been listened to (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).  
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Cheney (2002) also questions whether the MCC can fully realise an industrial democracy. 
He contends that management changes, such as the importing of management approaches like TQM 
at ‘high’ levels within MCC disproportionately affect ‘lower’ levels and change the spaces in which 
workers deliberate. Cheney (2002) suggests that participation in MCC is more likely to be de jure 
rather than de facto and is subject to invisible powers of neo-liberalism and marketization at 
national and global levels. This invisible power shapes values in organisations and society through 
the language of the ‘customer’ in MCC lexicon and by changing attitudes amongst workforce 
members towards consumption in society and political participation.  
In addition, associated with marketization a further invisible power has, in recent years, re-
emerged. In the wake of current global economic and political uncertainties affecting Spain, “the 
principle of secure membership and employment” (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014, p. 656) has become 
more important to MCC’s workers. Is insecurity exerting a pressure that leads to ‘degeneration’ of 
the democratic process (Cornforth, 1995) in which the integrity of democratic control is sacrificed 
out of a fear of job loss and economic insecurity? Pateman (1970), Cornforth et al. (1988) and 
Ridley Duff and Ponton (2013) all point to bodies of research that suggest the workforces do not 
necessarily want to participate in large numbers on governing bodies. Strauss (2006) views 
participation pessimistically and considers that even in organisations established to be democratic, 
participation goes through a natural life-cycle. It could be that MCC is in a phase where atrophy has 
set in bringing about a 
“…rhetoric of abandonment of the cooperative spirit and an abstainer stance…” 
     (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014, pp. 659, emphasis in original) 
However this may be countered by MCC’s continued obligations to invest in education 
(Whyte and Whyte 1991, Cheney 2002), itself an invisible power, shaping attitudes and values 
underpinned by cooperative principles. Case study research has already shown that ‘degeneration’ 
is neither automatic nor sustained, and can be reversed through a renaissance in the application of 
co-operative values (Cornforth, 1995; Wilson, 2011). 
 If the MCC has suffered during the recent financial crisis, the same cannot be said of JLP 
which has been uncharacteristically resilient. John Spedan Lewis, the original Chairman, created the 
governance structure of JLP enshrined in a constitution which he personally oversaw. Initially, 
therefore, the participation spaces were all invited (Lewis, 1954). This led to the formation of a 
Trust (in which the majority of Trustees are elected by the Partnership Council) that determines the 
number of constituencies from which Council members are elected. As a result, spaces are still 
invited in the sense that they are under the control of the Trust Company, but as elected 
representatives dominate its decision-making, an argument can be made that the constitution 
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ensures they are continually ‘claimed’ (JLP, 2013). Spedan noted the achievements of Robert Owen 
but claims he did not base any of his thinking on other theorists or practitioners. He pursued his 
own experiment and was cautious about making claims of ‘success’. He stated that ‘the whole thing 
has been a gradual, natural growth from practical efforts to solve the problems of one particular 
business’ (Lewis, 1948, p. IX) and as such it enabled the constitution to be refined as the partners 
learned about participation. 
 Currently the Partnership Council has 85 members (66 elected, 15 Partnership Board 
members plus 4 other positions). The Council’s power is very visible as any partner can attend their 
meetings but not vote unless they are a Council member. The Partnership Board includes 5 elected 
Council members who, along with 3 independent non-executive directors, form the majority. The 
other 7 members are selected by the Chairman. The Council has a governance role, whereas the 
Board and Chairman have both governance and management roles (JLP, 2014). The Council retains 
the ultimate sanction (rule 10) of being able to dismiss the Chairman (via a constitutionally 
mandated biannual vote) if s/he is not fulfilling ‘the responsibilities of his (sic) office’ (JLP, 2013, 
p. 10). Moreover, the Chairman is obligated (rule 45) ‘to accept as fully as possible the 
recommendations of the Partnership Council. Before rejecting any he (sic) must consult the 
Partnership Board’ (JLP, 2013, p. 18). In an interesting reversal of the normal power relations, it is 
the workforce (through the Partnership Council’s biannual vote) who continue to invite the 
Chairman to participate in management and governance. The Council’s power meets the criteria for 
‘managed participation’ of the Chairman (Ridley-Duff & Ponton, 2013).  
Individual partners are freely, and anonymously, able to express their opinion via two 
weekly journals (The Gazette is partnership wide while The Chronicle is branch specific). Any 
specific questions asked must be answered within 21 working days by the relevant management 
representative. Spedan explicitly linked democracy to this capacity for journalism to support 
freedom of speech (Lewis, 1948). It is not the only mechanism, however.  Collective voice is 
expressed through a hierarchical chain starting with Partner Voice bodies at store level, where 
members are elected to represent their team within a branch (typically on a 1:15 ratio). A 
representative of the senior management within the branch must attend the meetings as the 
“responsible manager” and provide necessary information. Regional representatives, covering 
approximately five or six branches are also elected, as well as Company specific Councils and 
ultimately the Partnership Council (voted for by the entire partnership). Partners delegate their 
authority and do not personally vote on specific items (unless they become a member of one of the 
Councils/Partner Voice bodies) (JLP, 2014). In JLP there is no equivalent body to the General 
Assembly at Mondragon.  
  14 
In Tables 2 and 3 we summarise our interpretation of the findings from these case studies in 
workforce participation to test our theoretical framework. In the next section, we critically review 
our interpretation to draw out our learning and outline the implications for theories of participation. 
Critical Comparison of Findings 
In Tables 2 and 3, we note our findings from both cases. Formally, the MCC (Table 2) is member-
driven network of co-operatives, in which power comes from below (in both individual member 
coops and the Mondragon Congress). This is reflected in the constitutional provisions for member-
driven participation in which democratic forums are visible, invited spaces for participatory 
decision-making. In light of critical works, however, there is some ambiguity about the actual level 
of participation, particularly in the General Assembly, and some questions about the relative powers 
of the social, governing and management councils (Kasmir, 1996; Cheney, 2002; Heras-
Saizarbitoria, 2014). For this reason, we have left question marks (?) to represent opportunities for 
future research on the operations and role of the General Assembly and whether the social councils 
are sites of ‘partial participation’ rather than ‘industrial democracy’. 
Formally, JLP (Table 3) is more complex, with a constitution that creates a mix of hidden, 
visible and invisible spaces for the Chairman and Partnership Board alongside visible sites of power 
to question their authority and hold the Chairman to account (through journals, the power of 
scrutiny, biannual votes and constitutional powers). There are also visible, member-driven spaces 
where the invitation to participate is constitutionally reinforced, and is reclaimed year on year 
through elections to governing bodies in branches, regions, subsidiary companies and the 
partnership. Within this, we found that the Partnership Council is more ‘claimed’ than ‘invited’ 
whereas the Board is more ‘invited’ than ‘claimed’ (more than half the places on the Council are 
elected, and fewer than half the Board are elected). 
Table 2 – Analysis of MCC 
Mondragon 
Governance 
Pateman (1970) / Hyman & Mason 
(1995) 
Ridley-Duff & Ponton (2014) 
Gaventa (2006) 
Spaces Power 
Pseudo/ 
Employee 
Involvement 
Partial/ 
Employee 
Participation 
Full/ 
Industrial 
Democracy 
No 
Involvement 
Passive 
Involvement 
Active 
Involvement 
Managed 
participation 
Member-
Driven  
Closed Invited 
(Re-) 
Claimed 
Visible Hidden Invisible 
Co-op 
General 
Assemblies 
 
?  
  
? ?  
 
 ()  
 
2 
Co-op 
Social 
Councils 
 
?  
   
?  
 
 ()  
 
 
Co-op 
Governing 
Councils 
  
 
    
 
 
 ()  
 
 
Mondragon 
Congress   
 
    
 
 
 ()  
 
 
Mondragon 
Standing 
Council 
  
 
    
 
 
 ()  
 
 
  
                                                 
2
  The hidden influence of the co-operative movement’s values and principles last updated by the ICA in 1995. 
  
 
Table 3 – Analysis of JLP 
JLP 
Governance 
Pateman (1970) / Hyman & Mason 
(1995) 
Ridley-Duff & Ponton (2014) 
Gaventa (2006) 
Spaces Power 
Pseudo/ 
Employee 
Involve-
ment 
Partial/ 
Employee 
Participation 
Full/ 
Industrial 
Democracy 
No 
Involvement 
Passive 
Involvement 
Active 
Involvement 
Managed 
participation 
Member-
Driven 
Closed Invited Claimed Visible Hidden Invisible 
Partnership 
Council   
 
   
  
 
()   
 
3 
Partnership 
Board  
 
    
 
  
 ()    
Chairman  ()4 
    
() 
 
 
  
   
Management
Boards    
 
    
 
  
  
 
Company 
Specific 
Council 
 
 
    
 () 
 
 ()  
  
Divisional 
Forum  
 
    
 () 
 
 ()  
  
Partner Voice 
 
 
    
 () 
 
 ()  
  
                                                 
3
  The ‘invisible’ power comes from the institutionalisation of the commitments to share power, information and gains (wealth). 
4
  As many of the Chairman’s powers are in the gift of the Partnership Council / Board, his / her participation is ‘managed participation’ from their perspective. 
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Both MCC and JLP have ambiguous relationships with the trade union movement. The 
MCC permits solidarity strikes for wider social protest (and for members to speak on behalf of 
labour interest in the General Assembly), but there are also bylaws that ban strikes at work on the 
grounds that democratic forums are the place resolve conflict (Whyte & Whyte, 1991). At JLP, 
trade unions are not recognised for collective bargaining, but the constitution includes recognition 
of the right to join a trade union. The official line is that JLP offers better collective bargaining 
machinery than would be available through a union (Cathcart, 2009). Similarly, we noted paradoxes 
between the considerable powers of the Chairman to act (in visible, invisible and hidden ways) and 
a biannual votes on his / her performance. The complex checks and balances in the constitution at 
JLP are recognisably different to the contracts of association signed by MCC member cooperatives 
and these reflect differences in their histories. 
On paper (see Tables 2 and 3), the MCC appears to embrace democracy more fully than the 
JLP. Each member has an individual vote in a General Assembly rather than a delegated one in the 
Partner Voice and Partners Council
5
.  But when there have been attempts to demutualise JLP, its 
constitution has demonstrated itself to be robust (perhaps more so) than Mondragon’s cooperative 
model. This was demonstrated in 1999 when an anonymous partner openly questioned via the 
internal newspaper whether JLP could be sold. A successful sale might have realised a pay out of 
£100,000 for each partner. The Chairman was duty bound to answer and explained that he had 
sworn an oath not to sell and that it required an act of Parliament to change trust deeds “designed to 
safeguard the Partnership’s future” (JLP, 2015). Legal advice was sought and the Partnership 
Council (140 partners) unanimously voted to reject a referendum. The matter was then dropped 
(Cathcart, 2009).  
A comparison can be made with the MCC through an account given by Mikel Lezamiz of an 
attempt to demutualise a cooperative in a previous study: 
The president of one co-op found a German company interested in buying them 
out. Of course, the co-ops are allowed to vote themselves out of the MCC if they 
want. Each worker stood to make €160,000 – we are not talking small amounts 
of money here – we are talking of over £100,000 per worker if they sold to the 
Germans. The president took this to the General Assembly. Two options were 
presented: sell-out, or spend to take on more members. They voted by a majority 
of one to take on members. He said that in discussions like this, they don’t think 
about capital growth going to the workers – they think that the residual value 
                                                 
5
  During fieldwork at JLP by the second named author, a partner described democracy as – “Leaders are paid to 
lead and partners are not involved in every decision but are able to hold the leadership to account for the 
decisions that they have made.” 
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they don’t take out is there for future generations. It is a collective asset they 
bequeath to the next generation. 
(Ridley-Duff, 2005, p. 255) 
The power to vote themselves out of the cooperative network is one of the ways that 
individual cooperatives can put pressure Mondragon to remain democratic (Smith & Teasdale, 
2012; Mccrea, 2012), but it also shows that they may be more vulnerable to executive capture. After 
winning the vote, the entire Governing Council in the above cooperative had to resign. The actions 
of the President, and the closeness of the vote, is in stark contrast to the constitutional constraints at 
JLP that prevent the Chairman from advocating the abandonment of industrial democracy. In this 
case, the Partnership Council – under the same obligation to uphold the constitution – voted 
unanimously against a sale. So, at JLP, any initiative to sell would not only have to come ‘from 
below’, it would also have to secure support from a Partnership Council and Chairman who are 
constitutional bound by Trust Law to protect the company’s assets for future generations of 
partners. Whilst Lezamiz reported similar sentiments over the protection of assets for future 
generations in the cooperatives at Mondragon (Ridley-Duff, 2005), the closeness of this vote 
suggests that the model may have vulnerabilities that could be addressed by placing MCC 
cooperative presidents under obligations similar to those of the Chairman at JLP. 
Our analysis would suggest that there are both invisible and visible powers at work. The 
visible powers (which are internalised as social norms) come from the institutionalised practices 
that have been built to fulfil the commitments in JLP’s and MCC’s written constitutions. The 
invisible powers come from the cooperative values and principles that guide Mondragon, and the 
commitments to sharing gain, information and power embodied in the writings of John Spedan 
Lewis. We observe in these case studies that the constitutions are the source of the invitations to 
workers to occupy democratic spaces, and that provisions for elections enable them to (re)claim 
them as sites of meaningful (member-driven) participation.  
Our contention is supported by Storey, et al., (2014) who argue that whilst the degeneration 
theory set out by the Webbs in the 1920s can be seen at various points in the histories of both MCC 
and  JLP, they have also been sites – beacons even - for the ‘regeneration’ of democratic 
cooperative ideals (Cornforth, 1995; Shift Change, 2013). However, we are sceptical that this power 
of regeneration is entirely the result of the invisible forces of the constitutions and cooperative 
principles exerting pressure on workers to reclaim spaces and power. In keeping with Storey et al. 
(2014), these pressures are felt more by managers who seek to (re)create spaces and invite workers 
to (re)participate to maintain their managerial legitimacy. Nowhere is this more evident that in the 
biannual vote on the performance of the Chairman at JLP. By continually having to satisfy 
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‘partners’ that he is acting in their interests, his managerial identity is defined by his oath to uphold 
the constitutional arrangements bequeathed to him. Two of the authors witnessed how this affects 
JLP’s Chairman at the 2015 Robert Oakeshott lecture in London. The following quotation, 
transcribed from the speech given by Charlie Mayfield, lends powerful support to Storey et al’s 
(2014) claim. 
We can and will […] make sure that the returns to labour are just as important 
as the returns to capital […] Our shareholders – in the partnership’s case, our 
partners - will hold us, hold me and others, to account for the extent to which we 
are able to do that. I often say to people that the partnership will not live or die 
based on whether our profits are £50m higher or lower. It will live or die on the 
basis of whether our partners believe that we are running our business in their 
interests. That is the single most important thing. 
Charlie Mayfield, JLP Chairman, Robert Oakeshott Lecture, 23
rd
 March 2015 
 As a testament to the claim that a member-driven system of cooperative governance can 
reshape managerial identities (and so change the power relations between capital and labour) it 
would be hard to find a more eloquent example. This quotation, spoken not to the workforce of JLP, 
but to the leaders of employee-owned companies, shows the power of a constitution and culture to 
reshape managerial identities. To hear the leader of one of the UK’s largest companies describe 
JLP’s business model as one that measures success in terms of ‘returns to labour’ suggests that the 
combined effects of a well-written constitution and the normative power of social economy values 
do have the capacity to alter economic assumptions. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, we must return to the question we asked at the start. “What can we learn about 
workforce participation from a comparative study of MCC and JLP?” Initially, we have to sound a 
note of caution. In drawing on published literature regarding structures and governance 
arrangements in MCC and JLP to inform our analysis, we are mindful that there has been a 
tendency, particularly with regard to MCC, to present co-operativism as a “managerial success 
story” (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014, p. 648). More critical literature draws attention to the reality of 
the “decoupling” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) organisational rhetoric from day-to-day practice, hence 
our analysis remains largely theoretical and in need of follow up studies with more extensive field 
work. 
However, we have advanced our understanding of theories of workforce participation and 
successfully tested their usefulness for interpreting case study findings. We discovered a vocabulary 
that enabled us to grapple with the nuances of the governance systems we studied. By bringing 
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together the works of different authors into a new theoretical framework, we discovered the value of 
considering who creates, manages and invites members into governance ‘spaces’. It matters who 
creates them, who is given the power of invitation and who manages them. ‘Spaces’ are the contexts 
in which ‘depth’, ‘scope’, ‘level’ and ‘quality’ of participation occurs, as set out by Ridley-Duff and 
Ponton (2013).  
Just as Ellerman (1990) once claimed that it is the direction of the hiring arrangement (and 
not the ownership of what is hired) that determines who benefits from the use of an asset, so the 
constitution of an organisation (and not just the ownership of the company) can determine who 
creates, controls and uses governance ‘spaces’. Where the contract (constitution) follows the social 
economy norm of measuring success in terms of ‘returns to labour’, it follows that key spaces for 
governance must be managed by the representatives of labour. In these spaces, the managers (but 
not the owners) of capital are invited to account for their work. However, this arrangement does not 
extend to operational management.  Here, the spaces continue to be created by specialists needed to 
organise production (operations managers). In these spaces, workers will continue to be invited by 
their managers to work under their direction. Understanding this paradox is something to investigate 
further and may account for the diversity of perspectives we found in the literature. 
We have, however, satisfied ourselves that our theoretical framework provides a useful lens 
for considering the findings of case studies in social economy governance. Future studies can focus 
on effective ways of studying changes over time, and how to describe and report the management of 
different spaces. We are also satisfied that viewing workplace democracy in terms of the 
responsiveness of management systems (and managers) to the desires and needs of the workforce 
and wider community merits more research. In finding that JLP’s constitutional commitments were 
effective in shaping managerial responses to an attempted demutualisation, this study suggests that 
replicating elements of JLP’s constitution could benefit social economy organisations that need to 
protect themselves against demutualisation. By making a cooperative president swear a legally 
binding oath to oppose the sale of members’ assets, there is a further line of defence against 
demutualisation. However, this study also suggests there is further ‘added value’ to this practice. It 
creates cultural artefacts that reshape the identities of senior managers so that they align their 
interests with the social, and not the private, economy. 
Word Count: 7660.  
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